British foreign policy: a tour d'horizon

Every international security pundit would like to summarise the broad sweep of strategic concerns facing the United Kingdom in a single hour. This is just such a lecture.

Sadly (or, for those of you reading it, happily), this is not mine. My comments are limited to parentheses. At least, not originally. Rather, it is a summary of the hour-long inaugural lecture of Professor Michael Clarke, the new director of the Royal United Services Institute.

Prof. Clarke began with the rather trite comment that this was a very uncertain time in international affairs. At such a time think tanks such as RUSI had a lot to offer, for they had the luxury to stoop and think while politicians were too busy reacting to events.

He began (apologetically) with a biblical quote: “the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong … [for] … time and chance happeneth to them all”. The them for (and title of) his essay was Strategy and Fortune, for luck as much as good planning played a role in foreign (one might argue all) policy. Good strategies can ride over bad luck, whereas bad strategies were destroyed by it.

Having said this, he turned to a long analysis of the Blair years. Until 1997, UK foreign policy had been shaped by Realist orthodoxy: sovereignty; territorial inviolability; balance-of-power. Blair characterised this as a “doctrine of benign inactivity” (though it was clear that he did not see this as quite so benign, as bystanders watching the tragedies of the Balkans and Rwanda might appreciate).

By comparison, Blair’s own foreign policy would be shaped by three strands:
1) Policy designed around values such as liberty, democracy, tolerance and justice, where “idealism becomes Realpolitik”
2) The integration of “hard power” (the power to compel) with “oft power” (the power to attract)
3) A recognition that the world was not benign to the UK and that we would therefore need to fight for our values: thus the liberal interventionism exemplified in his Chicago Speech.
This liberal interventionism would have to be based on two strategies: Leadership and Positioning. Leadership meant that the UK should be in the foreground – as it was with Kosovo, climate change and Iraq. Positioning meant that the UK’s success would depend on where it stood; in Blair’s view, the best place to be was among democratic allies, shoulder-to-shoulder with the United States.

Clarke then described Blair as a Shakespearian character whose great successes were followed by great tragedy. And he did indeed begin successfully: his first term saw an increased give and take within the EU, more focussed on the bigger picture; successful intervention in Kosovo where British and French leadership – the willingness to break a deadlock by using ground forces – won the war with Milosevic; a textbook humanitarian intervention in Sierra Leone; and Operation Desert Fox, which Clarke argued was in retrospect far more successful than was at first thought – it nearly led to Saddam’s ouster.

But the events of September 11th changed both the world and Blair’s fortune – not because of what Al Qaeda did, but because of America’s reaction to it. Blair’s April 2002 meeting with President Bush at Crawford, Texas left Blair convinced that the US would invade Iraq and that the UK must therefore back them. He therefore came up with a five point plan that highlighted both his focus on positioning and his self-belief (some might argue hubris). He would
1) Get Europe to back the US, which would encourage
2) The US to work though the UN, which would include
3) The US committing to a renewed push for peace in Palestine, which would lead to
4) A regional settlement for the whole Middle East, which would
5) Draw in the Neo-Cons in Washington as it would play into their democratisation agenda.

Eventually (perhaps sadly) he failed on all counts. Consequently the US went it “alone”, and the UK was bound to join them because of Blair’s conviction that this was the position that the UK must adopt if it was to have influence internationally. Four years later the objectives of the coalition have been radically revised, from creating a peaceful, democratic and free Iraq, they are now happy just to retreat with honour from an Iraq stable enough to hold together while Iraqis settle their own differences. The result for Blair was that he lost his power to lead or to take the initiative; indeed, an axis formed against him personally, led by Putin, Schroeder and Chirac. Blair tried to recover. Clarke noted the focus after 2003 on Africa, the environment and global poverty. Gleneagles was a personal triumph for Blair but perhaps also a parting gift from a G8 glad to be seeing the back of him.

The key messages from the Blair era were that
1) Globalisation is not inherently benign (especially if you are from the Third World) and is certainly not equitable
2) The UK is very well placed to benefit from Globalisation because it has an open society and a flexible economy]
3) The UK lives (and dies) by collective action
4) There is a crisis of collective action in the world today.

At this point Clarke turned to the future, and noted that the challenges for the future depended on how one viewed it. Traditional international security problems would focus on the Middle East, a resurgent Russia, Britain’s place in Europe. Trans-national problems included crime, terror, WMDs, energy-, cyber- and food-security. Structural problems include global inequality, climate change, health and failing states. What is not clear is in what way these impact on Britain. What is clear is that the international consensus is weak, unclear and ineffective, and that even the powerful were struggling to impose their will.

In dealing with the apparent problems highlighted above, however, there was a tendency to ignore the problems of international structures – how one achieves an international consensus. There was almost a tragic fatalism that accepted the failure of international institutions since the Cold War, with new sources of legitimacy replacing “clear pillars” with a “subtle constellation of power”; difficulties of control and influence as a result of network, globalised and disaggregated economies; changing “rules of the game” as international law leant more towards human security.

In fact, international law was weaker rather than stronger, and the West only had itself to blame. The West had played fast and loose with international law – acts of humanitarian intervention had undermined legal norms. This was a dangerous game to play, for in what would be the “Asian Century” the West would lose power and influence, and “rules matter most to the least powerful.”

Yet Clarke remained optimistic. He believe that the US would gain from considering and addressing these issues; the UK would gain by working collectively, which it was traditionally good at; the UK remained part of a broad international consensus (if one looked beyond the immediate challenge of Iraq); and the UK had good armed forces. But Britain must be cautious about using them; their very quality led to a tendency to reach for force too soon. He also lamented (as did Lord Ashdown in his recent book) that while the military was more joined up than ever, it was woefully disconnected from humanitarian and civil agencies.

Blair was, in Clarke’s view, correct to position itself beside the US, but the UK must also recognise that the US is entering an introspective stage, and that when it emerges the old certainty that its Janus-faced strategy would always put the Atlantic fist would be gone; in the coming century, America would be a Pacific power first-and-foremost. The UK’s role in the C21st would be to be a hub rather than a pillar of international security, acting to articulate and lead the consensus (as the Stern Review did on climate change).

As for Europe, it would remain peaceful and prosperous, but in the Asian Century, it would increasingly struggle for latitude in which to manoeuvre.

A full transcript is available from RUSI.

More wisdom from Paddy Ashdown

Last I outlined the peacekeeping wisdom of Paddy Ashdown, as set out in his new book, Swords and Ploughshares. However, he has been dispensing other wise words recently, as well.

On 11 July he was interviewed on 18 Doughty Street. As well as discussing his book, he sets out a frankly ominous prognosis for the future situation in Iraq and (worse still) Afghanistan. If we lose, he suggests, we face the beginnings of a regional civil war across the Middle East (in the sense that Mao Tse-tung saw the First and Second World Wars as European civil wars), the collapse of Nato and the end of our willingness to intervene to prevent conflicts around the world.

He also had some very interesting things to say about the liberal Democrats, however, and especially about Sir Menzies Campbell. He gave quite a good description of the House of Commons, Prime Minister’s Question Time and the difficulties of being the leader of the third party (7.30mins). As he later explains, “I would much rather have taken the risk of going into Sarajevo through the siege than standing up at Prime Minister’s questions the House of Commons. It seems far less dangerous and far less frightening.”

Of particular note is his comment on Ming’s performance in comparison to his own. “People forget this when they comment on Ming Campbell’s Prime Minister’s question, which I think have become actually quite good, I was a disaster. I was a disaster for the first year as leader of the then-Liberal Party. I was ritually handbagged in front of the television cameras of the nation… by Mrs. Thatcher, and people went around saying ‘Will this guy ever hack it?’ You just have to learn how to deal with that.” (8.30mins)

And what space is there for the Lib Dems in the new British politics. Ashdown cautions patience. The shine will come off both Cameron and Brown, he predicts. Ming should concentrate on sagacity, integrity, experience – these are the qualities that will work in our favour in the coming year or two.

He has many interesting insights into Tony Blair, whom he likes and admires and with whom he came close to working in quasi-coalition. In a particularly germane moment, he sums up Blair’s career in a manner that bloggers would have died to have managed only a few weeks ago. Ashdown tells us that Blair said to him that three things would define his term in office: 1) that Labour and the Lib Dems would realign British politics; 2) Blair would re-associate Britain with its historic role at the centre of Europe; and 3) Blair would do something about the widening gap between rich and poor. On all three he has failed.

Finally, the best moment has to be Paddy’s giggle when Iain tells him that when Iain heard Gordon Brown had offered Ashdown a cabinet job, he naturally assumed that it must have been foreign secretary (33mins). Paddy obviously didn’t think this was quite such a natural conclusion.

It was ten years ago today

Ten years after being elected, Tony Blair has expressed regrets, apparently. I can imagine that would take a while!

InnerWest sums up Tony Blair's successes and failures thus:

Tony's Tenure's Top Three....

1. An Independent Central Bank. People really have never had it so good.
2. Northern Ireland. The IRA - remember them?
3. Devolution. Not everybody agrees about how much power should be given
away from the centre, but the important thing is that some was and it's gaining
it's own momentum....

and the Bottom Two:

1. Foreign Policy. An ethical intent gave way to the allure of the ends
justifying the means - only for the ends to become an almost unmitigated
fiasco.
2. Public Services. Lavishing money and ducking tough questions does not
equate to reform, just a stay of execution.

Well, 3-2 seems to be a victory for Blair.

Then again, Inner West seem to have discounted a number of (own) goals:

1) Spin - need we say more?
2) Cash for Honours - because Cash for Questions was so last government
3) Human Rights - they started so well, and then it all fell to pieces
4) That economic record, which ignores the fact that unemployment, inflation and taxes all rising

5) "Education, Education, Education" - three times as much priority, and still a quarter of school leavers are illiterate, a quarter innumerate, and a third have no qualifications worth a damn...

One really could go on!

So go on. Why not add your own personal lowlights of the Blair administration. After all, it was ten years ago tomorrow!

Another bit of favouritism for Tony’s Cronies?

Ministers, civil servants and the public have all been shocked and appalled by the recent fashion for kiss-and-tell accounts of the inner workings of government.

While I well-written memoir is wonderfully enlightening, and the details of the Hutton Enquiry and Butler Review exposed Blair’s sofa government for what it is, the salacious bean-spilling by some civil servants and ministers has been to the detriment of the service.

One can understand why the Government has sought to limit further breaches of the secrecy that must exist within ministerial offices. Personally, I find any effort to limit free speech to be worrying, and I fully support open government. However, there must be a degree of trust between ministers and their colleagues, and between ministers and civil servants, and it is not unreasonable to require people to commit in advance to secrecy. It is a normal practice for lawyers and Catholic priests, after all. One cannot compel a person to be silent, but one may justifiably insist that they choose between their right to speak freely and their desire to take a particular job. Accepting a post as a minister, civil servant or special adviser should carry with it a commitment to discretion.

Meanwhile, one would expect the law to be implemented blindly, without favouritism. So it is extremely disturbing to read that the Government has been accused of dragging its feet over implementation of its own rules so as to enable Alastair Campbell to publish his diaries before the new rules come into effect.

According to Chris Grayling, the Conservative Shadow Transport Secretary,

“The Government now appears to have a completely cavalier attitude to the rules
of Whitehall when it comes to looking after people who have been close to Tony
Blair and Gordon Brown. This is quite obviously a blatant attempt to delay
things so that Alastair Campbell can get on with publishing his diaries without
anyone intervening to stop him.”

Of course, without presenting evidence, Mr. Grayling is potentially making a scurrilous accusation. However, as the collapse in the confidence between ministers and civil servants is a direct result of the manner in which the Labour government has itself used leaks and spin to control the news, it seems hardly beyond them to play so fast-and-loose with the principles of good government.

Awkward memoirs and embarrassing leaks are a problem of their own making. Sadly, it now seems likely that they are further compounding the problem by once again turning them to their advantage.

What future for Tony Blair

Tony Blair has told DJ and former TFI Friday presenter Chris Evans that after he leaves office he would like to find a job with “a real purpose to it.”

It will certainly be a challenge. Most Prime Ministers effectively retire, though they turn a tidy sum on the lecture circuit. According to The Observer, John Major makes £30,000 a speech. But Mr. Blair’s ego is likely to prevent him fading away into memory.

One thing is sure. Mr. Blair will not sit happily on the backbenches. I doubt he will fight the next general election, and if he does he will not be seen much in the chamber (No change there, then!).

So what will he do with all the time on his hands? His (typically-tortuous) comments to Mr. Evans are instructive: "I think the single thing for me that is most important is that whatever I do afterwards it has a real purpose to it, that it is not just about doing a job," he said. The job of Prime Minister was “a position that once you have occupied it you have done something that has what I call a real life purpose to it… And certainly in anything I wanted to do afterwards, it would be a different purpose but similar in its motivation."

With his penchant for strutting the world stage and his line in highfaluting and emotionally-charged rhetoric, Mr. Blair surely has his eye on some international prize. If so, it is a forlorn hope. In the eyes of much of the world, Mr. Blair is damaged goods, forever tainted by his association with George Bush, the War on Terror and Iraq.

Members are unlikely to agree to Mr. Blair filling any key UN role; the idea of Mr. Blair as a future High Commissioner for Human Rights is absurd, even if any link between him and the outrages on Guantanamo Bay or Abu Ghraib is unfair. Similarly, European governments are unlikely to tolerate a Blair bid to be President of the European Commission; despite his vaunted Europhilia, he has not brought Britain into the Euro, he divided the continent over his Iraq policy, and (ironically, from a British perspective) he is seen as dangerously liberal among our socialist and dirigiste neighbours. Neither is any charity or campaign group going to risk turning off a large swathe of its potential donors by associating itself with such a divisive figure.

Tony Blair’s only hope is to found his own charity and use it as a springboard to launch himself across the world. Perhaps he sees himself as the next Al Gore. But as his pitiful effort this week to bring peace to the Middle East (and goodwill to all men) has highlighted, he is a man whose ambitions far outpace his capabilities.

Whether because he is unable to find a role in a post-Blair world, or because he fails to live up to the challenges he sets for himself, Mr. Blair’s post-premiership is likely to be a failure. History will repeat itself as both tragedy and farce.

Why I take no joy from Tony Blair's shame

So far Liberal Democrat bloggers appear to have been remarkably quiet about the announcement today that the Prime Minister has been interviewed by police over the "cash-for-honours" scandal. Perhaps this is wise. Until we know the outcome of the investigation, it is too early to crow.

Actually, I doubt very much whether I will ever manage a sense of schadenfreude over this issue. The fact that a serving Prime Minister has been questioned by police fills me with a sense of great sadness and some degree of shame. Where even lesser-ranking Labour dignitaries to face trial, let alone be found guilty, it would be a lasting shame to our country and its political system.

One of the reasons why Britain has done so well economically over the past quarter of a century is that we are known internationally as a place where business is transacted honestly, free from the corruption that blights so many other jurisdictions. This is why another, unconnected story, fills me with equal concern. The Attorney General announced today that the investigation by the Serious Fraud Office into corruption relating to BAE's Al Yamamah contract has been discontinued. The reason given was that it was in danger of harming Anglo-Saudi relations, and implicitly our chances of future arms sales.

I have never been one of those who believed that we should not sell arms internationally, or that the Saudi's were beyond the pale (I would happily sell them aircraft, but would draw the line at items that can be used for internal repression or torture). But the cancelling of this investigation also suggests that Britain is prepared to tolerate corruption if the price is right.

These two stories, coming as they do on the same day, can only harm our image internationally and (imperceptibly, because such damage is always harder to discern than the obvious quick-win) impact upon our economy. Perhaps more seriously, it damages a reputation for honesty and integrity of which we can be justifiably proud.

President Blair? He wants it as much as we do!

It is a criticism often levelled at over-mighty Prime Ministers that they secretly wish they could be President. It is a claim often made of Tony Blair, and I recall Margaret Thatcher being similarly accused. In fact, nothing could be further from the truth.

The reason for this misconception lies in the apparently vast powers of American presidents. French presidencies can also appear to omnipotent, as governments are appointed from The Élysée Palace without their members needing to be members of the National Assembly. One assumes that the constitutional presidencies of Germany, Italy and Israel are not the model of which critics are thinking when they accuse British prime ministers of dreaming of a presidency.

In fact, while American presidents appear mighty from across the Atlantic, they have far less power within their realms than a British prime minister. The power and position of a British prime minister lies in the fact that he has (barring the occasional bout of back-bench uppitiness) a majority in the legislature. Thus, executive and legislature are intrinsically wed in a manner that would be alien in the United States.

As last month’s congressional elections should bring home to us, presidents risk seeing their power checked by rival legislatures. Indeed, despite George Bush’s good fortune in having a “friendly” congress for most of his administration, even the republican-controlled House and Senate occasionally blocked his plans, notably over social service reform and immigration.

By comparison, a British Prime Minister is free to do almost anything he wishes. His parliamentary majority and the weakness of the second chamber enable him to pass almost any legislation. Budgets are not picked over and amended, but nodded through by compliant MPs. Vast areas of Government do not even require parliament, as they are still subject to the Royal Prerogative. And the Prime Minister is never personally subject to a serious vote: rather than having to face the electorate, one-on-millions, the Prime Minister has the comfort of a pocket borough to ensure that he, at least, will always be returned. He can stuff the upper house with his placement, pick his Cabinet and appoint judges, ambassadors and senior officials without their ever being questioned by an appointments committee. Offences to liberty such as the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Bill would never be possible were Britain to have a written constitution, which a British presidency would necessitate.

No, you may rest assured that Tony Blair is quite happy being a humble Prime Minister. Let others have the titular supremacy, along with the administrative headaches of constitutional government and the checks and balances on their power. Let them face re-election in their own right. For British Prime Ministers, it’s far preferable to be a mere servant of the Crown.

How Britain can be a true friend of the United States

Lurking under a headline worthy of The Times’s new tabloid format is a damning indictment of Tony Blair’s failure to manage Britain’s relationship with America. According to Dr. Kendall Mayers, a UK specialist at the State Department, Blair’s relationship with George Bush has been “a one sided relationship that was entered into with open eyes… there was nothing. There was no payback, no sense of reciprocity”.

Herein lies the root of much of the failure of Western policy in the Middle East. I have been and remain a staunch defender of the Atlantic Alliance and Britain’s “special relationship” with the United States. I am unashamed to call myself an friend of America. Yet the current Administration has treated the British Government with utter contempt. While I do not doubt the sincerity of Labour ministers when they say that they have always made strong representations to the American Government in private, it is clear that these have been brushed aside in a naïve display of hubris.

The catalogue of missed opportunities is long. Between 9/11 and the Iraq War, Britain pressed the US to take a holistic approach to the Middle East; no settlement could be achieved if the Israel/Palestine tragedy was not resolved. Yet the Bush administration has steered clear of this knottiest of problems, leaving it as a festering wound enraging Muslim opinion.

Only a few days ago Jeremy Greenstock, formerly Britain’s chief diplomat in Iraq, reiterated the claim that Britain urged the US-run Coalition Provisional Authority not to disband the Iraqi army. The Americans ignored this advice, sacked three hundred thousand of troops and started aggressively de-Baathifying the country. The newly jobless and disaffected quickly mounted an insurgency that only later took on an Islamist dimension.

The UK has repeatedly urged the US to close the Al Queda recruiting office at Guantanamo Bay. And the US ignored Britain’s suggestion that they engage with Iran in 2004; two years later we will go to Tehran cap-in-hand.

This is a tragedy. When asked on his death-bed what his greatest mistake was, President Eisenhower famously stated that he should have supported Britain over the Suez War. Despite the illegality of this conflict, the Anglo-French debacle gave a fillip to Arab nationalism that led directly to the Baathist takeover in Iraq and so to this second, equally ill-starred conflict. I do not tell this story to justify either that war on this one. Rather, I wonder whether President Bush will also one day come to rue ignoring British advice and treating his closest ally as a client state.

Having said all this, I do not share Dr. Mayers pessimism that the “special relationship” is doomed. However, a re-evaluation is due. Both Britain and America must learn that friends and allies serve one another best when being honest and tough with one another. There are many truths that friends do not wish to hear, but a real friend does not sit quietly by and bury his fears because he does not want to upset his friend with an uncomfortable truth. Rather, he tells it how he sees it, sticks to his guns (or ploughshares) and challenges his friend to prove his fears ungrounded. This is not what the Blair government has done, nor what the Bush administration has encouraged. But this is what the future must entail.

Britain must be a true friend to the United States. To be this, we must be a friend that says the truth.

David Cameron blue-rinse update

For the truly wonkish among you, MP3 downloads of the entire Economist/Stockholm Network debate David Cameron is just a blue-rinse Tony Blair? are now available here.

A synopsis of the event (their's, not mine) reads:

What is David Cameron for? He downplays tax cuts, is socially liberal and believes in a muscular foreign policy (and voted for the Iraq war). He would like to reform public services to give consumers more choice, and to involve private companies and charities in providing them. Sound familiar? And if so, is that a bad thing? After all, policies like these have just won three elections in a row. Will the new Cameron era be a break with the past or a return to true-blue values? Is Mr Cameron just a softer, pre-Thatcher Tory with a dollop of belief in the possibility of progress added? Can he create a vision for the future which his entire party can support, or will he only serve to divide the party further? And would Britain governed by a Cameron-led Conservative Party feel very different to Britain today?

Speakers: Prof. Dennis Kavanagh
Peter Hitchens, The Mail on Sunday
Dr Ian Kearns, Deputy Director, ippr
Jesse Norman, Senior Fellow, Policy Exchange
Chaired by Johnny Grimond, Writer-at-large,The Economist
Polling from Andrew Cooper, Populus