Showing posts with label credit crunch. Show all posts
Showing posts with label credit crunch. Show all posts

Wednesday, 7 January 2009

Haven't I already said all this?

This all sounds very familiar!



In the words of Ludwig von Mises, "a government can spend or invest only what it takes away from its citizens... Its additional spending and investment curtails the citizens' spending and investment to the full extent of its quantity."

Monday, 22 December 2008

The Green Road to Nowhere

History is repeating itself, though whether as tragedy or farce awaits to be seen. As our economy enters another of its periodic recessions, caused as ever by government meddling in the economy, politicians race to solve the problem with further doses of the same poison.

Sadly, in an age where politicians fear differentiating themselves from one another and parties squabble over a consensus they disingenuously call the middle ground, there seems to be no real debate over how best to ensure that the recession that we are now in is as brief as possible. Just as President Hoover’s failed interventions were succeeded by President Roosevelt’s even greater interventions, so today politicians seem to be in a bidding war to intervene in the economy.

The latest dose comes from the Liberal Democrats, who have joined the chorus with their latest call for action. Nick Clegg has announced a Green Road Out of the Recession that is built on the same errors that underpin Labour’s proposals and the $4.61 trillion US bailout.

It is a simple error, summed up by Henry Hazlitt when he notes that “The art of economics consists in looking not merely at the immediate but at the longer effects of any act or policy; it consists in tracing the consequences of that policy not merely for one group but for all groups.” It is the error of looking at the immediate results of what one does but not the damage that doing it causes; specifically, of believing that one can utilize a resource (in this case, money) for one purposes without denying it to another.

So let us be utterly clear: when the Lib Dems say “Now is the time for big investment to get the wheels of the economy turning again”, any rational observer should immediately ask “From where is the money coming, and what will be sacrificed so that this investment can be achieved?”

It is an impressive list the Lib Dems have compiled: new trains; new railways; new track; social homes; insulated lofts; smart meters. It will “create jobs and ensure that once this recession is over, we have something to show for the money we borrowed.” All of which is true, but what it does not show is all the jobs that will not be created because the money that would have been spent creating those jobs has been siphoned off by government to pay for its own projects.

There is absolutely no reason why government spending of £12.5 billion (as the Lib Dems propose) should create more jobs than private spending of £12.5 billion. On the contrary: while markets operate specifically to maximise economic efficiency – by, for example, allowing people to spend money on projects that will maximise their own utility – government’s have no such built-in discipline and no means of weighing the efficiency or efficacy of different projects. In fact (as the sorry litany of failed government projects demonstrates) governments all too often blow vast sums of taxpayers’ money on projects that promise big benefits but deliver dubious or disappointing outcomes.

I should add that this is not a criticism of any individual project and certainly not of the environmental (“green”) thrust of the proposals. That the “road out of recession” is “green” is irrelevant. We could as easily talk about the white heat of technology or indulge in some blue-skies thinking. The point is that this is being sold on economic, not environmental, grounds; if the Lib Dems were as keen on agriculture as we are on environmentalism, we could as easily advocate policies akin to President Hoover’s New Deal farm programme, and the proposals would be no less flawed. Government cannot spend the country out of recession.

The reason for this is that government money must come from somewhere, and not matter what its source, it merely transfers money from one use to another. If we spend £12.5 billion on new trains to “create jobs” and “stimulate industry” then the money, workers and materials that are diverted to those ends are no longer available to make shoes, televisions, meals or whatever else we might buy. The net effect in jobs created, wages spent and economic activity stimulated is zero.

Indeed, while we may scoff at the 2.5% cut in VAT and say that the £12.5 billion could be better spent insulating lofts, it ignores the fact that the £12.5 billion would otherwise have been spent by consumers on (for example) carpets. The criticism that the VAT cut would not in fact encourage people to buy is valid in as far as an individual price reduction of 2.13% is not going to make a product hugely more attractive to buy. But the fact that the money remains in people’s pockets means that it will eventually be spent somewhere. It will still represent an increase in consumer demand and so will stimulate growth.

Thus the one part of the Green Road Out of the Recession which is sound is the bit that promises “big, permanent tax cuts”. It is the bit that has been policy for over a year and upon which conference voted. It would transfer spending from inefficient governments to efficient consumers and so allocate resources in the marketplace (that is to say you and me and our respective savings) most efficiently.

A couple of additional points need to be made, to head off possible comments (welcome though all comments are, of course!). Firstly, it makes no difference if the government gets the money through taxation, inflation or borrowing. Borrowing has exactly the same effect as taxation in as much as it diverts savings from being invested in industry and instead invests it in public services; there is still no net gain. It also lands future taxpayers with a bill, so diverting money from future generations to the present. Inflation is effectively a flat tax: if we “print” an additional 1% of money, we are reducing the value of everybody’s savings and wages by 1% - an “inflation tax” that falls as heavily on the poor as it does on the rich (except that rich people are more likely to own commodities or foreign assets that are inflation proof, so inflation may actually be regressive). It also creates imbalances in the economy that will lead to further crises in the future.

Secondly, it makes no difference that this is supposedly “investment” rather than mere “spending”. It is certainly true that this sort of government spending will ensure that “once this recession is over, we [will] have something to show for the money we borrowed.” I have a house to show for the money I borrowed in December, but it does not follow that I made a sound “investment”. Had my internal chancellor not borrowed and spent, my internal taxpayer would not now be saddled with debt.

As Adam Smith noted over two centuries ago, “What is prudence in the conduct of every private family can scarce be folly in that of a great kingdom”. What is more, the fact that we can see what the borrowing has financed should not blind us to the fact that we cannot see the things that the borrowing has denied us: other investments will have been sacrificed. And finally, even spending on consumer fripperies stimulates long-term investment: if demand for MP3 players and trainers increases, so does investment in the production and retailing of these (so creating jobs) and in the infrastructure needed to move them about. Indeed, as taxes/inflation/borrowing tend to make it particularly hard for new businesses to arise, because capital formation (i.e. saving) is harder and credit is absorbed by government, new start-up businesses such as those marketing new solutions to environmental problems struggle to get off the ground. Big government spending may therefore be counter-productive even environmentally!

I also ought to add that members of other parties shouldn’t’ take too much pleasure in seeing me demolish my own party’s latest policy initiative. Neither Labour nor the Conservatives have exactly covered themselves in glory during the present economic crisis and both are participating in the flawed concensus politics outlined above. This article focuses on Liberal Democrat policy only because errors are doubly galling when they come from within one’s own camp and I would like to see the Lib Dems taking a braver, more distinctive and more honest approach to the current crisis that did not argue that more government can get us out of a problem that government made in the first place. The alternative norm of passing money through the hands of politicians instead of citizens has been Labour and Conservative policy for the last century and it has been a tragic disappointment.

Tuesday, 9 December 2008

Why the Government’s plans to rescue the economy don’t seem to be working

The Times captures the mood perfectly: “The economy is plunging deeper into recession despite emergency tax cuts and the multibillion-pound bank bailout, the Bank of England said yesterday.”

What it fails to mention is that this is all utterly predictable and indeed inevitable. The reason that “Cutting the base rate to its lowest level in more than 50 years, the Bank said the outlook now was worse than a month ago, with manufacturing and consumer spending in sharp decline” is that cutting the base rate is not going to have much impact.

The base rate is just one driver of credit, and it is not by far the most important. What is more, it does not address the real problems in the economy, which is that the credit expansion of the last decade has fooled entrepreneurs into thinking that investments were viable when in fact they were not. In some cases, whole businesses will now need to be liquidated as reality crashes in on those who had been fooled by artificially-low interest rates.

Reducing interest rates again cannot solve the problem. Just as the first rule when one finds oneself in a hole is to stop digging, so the first rule when one finds oneself facing the inevitable crash following an inflationary spike is to stop inflating. Further interest cuts (as preached by all political parties) are simply attempts to stimulate more credit expansion, which means further inflation. This will lead to more poor decisions by entrepreneurs and more unviable businesses being created, expanded or propped up. That can only lead to an even bigger crisis in the long run.

“The Bank of England pinned much of the blame for the economy’s slide on the borrowing drought that high street banks have inflicted on consumers and businesses alike” according to The Times, but in doing so the Bank misses the point. The borrowing drought is the result of banks making sensible economic decisions in avoiding making the same kind of loans that got us into this mess in the first place.

For let’s be clear about this: the loans that the banks are currently proving reluctant to make are those that they fear may not be repaid; those that, in American parlance, are “sub-prime”. In a market where asset prices are falling, many homeowners are in negative equity and many businesses are destined for bankruptcy, further lending would not only be stupid, it would be irresponsible.

Far from cutting interest rates, the Bank of England should be raising them so as to reduce the demand for credit and increase the desire of savers to provide it. In doing so, it will not only redress the massive imbalance between saving and borrowing that has led the West to borrow trillions of dollars of the (thrifty) Asians as well as creating money through government-backed central banks, but it will also accelerate the reallocation of “factors of production” between unviable and viable industries. As a result, it might just make this a sharp but short recession, instead of another painfully-drawn-out one.

Tuesday, 25 November 2008

An eerie echo of the past

Earlier on I set out how 80 years ago an Austrian economist predicted the ineffectiveness of current efforts to intervene to improve economic conditions.

I have since been directed to an interview with another Austrian economist (this one also a British citizen) that - aside from the poor quality and the stilted voices - could have been recorded yesterday.

In it, Nobel laureate Prof. Friedrich von Hayek explains that inflation is always the result of government action, is the great evil against which we need to battle, and that efforts to intervene to prevent recessions that follow from periods of government-led inflation are doomed to failure.
The part of the inteview from 14.00 minutes to 16.50 minutes is particuarly chilling!

The following is a summary of what he says (I have slightly augmented it with my own understanding of his take on economics, though where possible I have enclosed these additions in square brackets):

  1. Germany out-performed the UK in the three decades after WWII because the German trades unionists remembered that inflation is the enemy of the working man;
  2. If people do not recognise the danger of inflation they will continue to believe that it can be used as a short-term solution to economic problems, as a result of which inflation will continue to wreak havoc upon the economy;
  3. Unemployment results from inflation, which encourages the misdirection of labour [because easy money is made available to enterprises that would not, under normal conditions, be viable, allowing them to offer higher wages than would be possible if the easy money had not been thrown into the system by Government], so it is wrong to suggest that in the long term one needs to tolerate unemployment to curb inflation;
  4. Curbing inflation will cause short-term unemployment, but this need only last a year or so [before the market re-asserts itself and labour is employed once again];
  5. As Jeffrey Tucker notes, the “hilariously naive and idiotic” line of questioning demonstrates how “people really believe that policy makers can manipulate the economy like a machine, trading off unemployment for inflation and back again, with no trouble”
  6. Non-compulsory planning will have no effect and so can do no harm [or, indeed, any good];
  7. “Stopping the printing presses” is a euphemism as the real cause of inflation is credit expansion rather than the actual printing of hard money;
  8. “All inflation is ultimately the problem of activities which government determines and can control. And all inflations have been stopped in the past by the governments stopping creating money or preventing the central bank from creating more money” [thus putting the lie to the government’s suggestion that inflation is caused by outside factors such as rises in the cost of commodities];
  9. A tax cut will not work to stimulate the economy because deficiency of aggregate demand is not the problem. Rather, the problem is that the boom and employment that has been created by the previous inflation can only be sustained by further inflation [which, if perpetuated, would lead to hyper-inflation and ultimately a crisis];
  10. If government continues to inflate to sustain the boom it may have to try to ameliorate the effects by imposing price controls which will lead to the imposition of a planned economy [i.e. socialism];
  11. Political freedom exists hand-in-hand with economic freedom and the former cannot exist without the latter;
  12. The power of labour unions and corporations does not lead to inflation unless that power is used to encourage inflationary policies;
  13. Wages/Prices/Incomes policy is utterly ineffective except as a means of managing in the very short term the period of deflation/restoration;Not all problems are solvable in the short-term and trying to do so may cause more harm than good;
  14. Equities remain a good investment in the long term;
  15. “Inflation is like over-eating and indigestion. Over-eating is very pleasant; so is inflation. Indigestion comes only afterwards and so people do not see the connection”;
  16. Economists are intellectually attracted to the concept of a system that they can control and therefore are instinctively opposed to free markets and non-intervention;
  17. Continued government-induced inflation and subsequent intervention by government will inevitably destroy capitalism [as Karl Marx predicted and hoped for].
Hat tip to Kit for drawing it to my attention, and to mises.org for hosting it.

Forced bank lending the latest instalment in Labour’s doomed spiral of intervention

Alistair Darling appears set to commit an 80 year old mistake. In his misguided attempts to control the UK economy and force businesses to conform to New Labour’s agenda, he is again going to intervene between banks and their customers.

He has already intervened countless times over the past year, but this latest intervention is pitifully predictable. Indeed, as was explained 80 years ago, it was inevitable that his previous interventions would have unintended consequences that would be the opposite of what he intended, and that to counter those consequences he would be obliged to intervene again and again to ever greater degrees.

Published in 1929, just as another depression was about to rock the world economy, Ludwig von Mises’s Critique of Interventionism demonstrated that as soon as politicians began to intervene in the economy, they would have to continue to do so until ultimately the entire system came under their control. According to von Mises, interventionism was simply unsustainable: either one accepted the laws of economics or one was forced to implement socialism.

We can see how this works if we consider price controls – an example that has striking relevance to Mr. Darling’s current dilemma.

If government tries to fix the price of a commodity, it will not be able to sustain prices below those that the unhampered market would set. This is because with price controls:
"Sellers are forced to sell their goods at lower prices, so that proceeds fall below costs. Therefore, the sellers will abstain from selling and hold on to their goods in the hope that the government regulation will soon be lifted. But the potential buyers will be unable to buy the desired goods."
The result, therefore, will not be the increasing availability that the government sought but a reduced availability of the good resulting from suppliers having no wish to supply at such a low price. To raise supply to the level the government desires at the price the government has mandated, it must therefore intervene again to force suppliers to supply the good: “…it tends to supplement the price ceiling with an order to sell all goods at this price as long as the supply lasts."

However, as the good is now on sale for below its real value, far more customers will emerge than would do so if the good was priced naturally. And since the price is "below that which the unhampered market would set, the same quantity of goods faces a greater number of potential buyers who are willing to pay the lower official price. Supply and demand no longer coincide; demand exceeds supply, and the market mechanism, which tends to bring supply and demand together through changes in price, no longer functions."

There is still not enough of the good to go round, but now it is not because of suppliers reticence but excess demand caused by under-pricing. Government has prevented the price mechanism from operating to prioritise this demand. Therefore another means must be found to decide who gets what, which leads to the third wave of intervention: Rationing.

"Of course, government cannot be content with this selection of buyers. It wants everyone to have the goods at lower prices, and would like to avoid situations in which people cannot get any goods for their money. Therefore, it must go beyond the order to sell; it must resort to rationing. The quantity of merchandise coming to the market is no longer left to the discretion of sellers and buyers."
But why, if the price is below that at which suppliers can make a profit, would they produce the good at all? Only if the government intervenes to force the production of the good. Consequently, the fourth intervention takes place:

"When that is exhausted the empty inventories will not be replenished because production no longer covers its costs. If government wants to secure a supply for consumers it must pronounce an obligation to produce."
And how can this be achieved when costs are below prices? Only by driving down costs, which requires government to intervene to set the prices of the factors of production that go into producing the good. Ergo, "it must fix the prices of raw materials and semi-manufactured products, and eventually also wage rates, and force businessmen and workers to produce and labor [sic.] at these prices."

But what, you may ask, has this to do with Mr. Darling? If one considers money and borrowing to be commodities, the answer is everything.

Government has long been intervening to keep the cost of borrowing below the market rate. This is the role of central banks: they enable governments to control the supply of money by forcing lending rates down below the market rate, so stimulating artificial and unsustainable booms that keep the voters sweet until the next election. The Bank of England did this again last month. Under normal circumstances, a “credit crunch” should result in an increase in the cost of borrowing. This would result in more saving and less borrowing until a new equilibrium was reached. However, the government has intervened to keep the cost of borrowing low.

As von Mises predicted, however, this has had unintended consequences. The government may have wanted low interest rates, but the banks were still inclined to set interest rates based on risk: as default is more likely now than it was a couple of years ago, the cost of borrowing is raised to take an actuarial account of risk. Also, as the banks have limited capital, they are bound to lend to the most profitable borrowers: those who will pay higher rates. So inevitably the government is again inclined to intervene to force banks to lower rates.

The predictable result is that banks won’t lend. They’d rather buy government securities or look abroad for more valuable investments than lend to businesses and householders at rates that are no higher than inflation or make a tiny real return but involve huge risk (companies will go to the wall; mortgagees will default). So the third intervention comes, as Darling forces the banks to lend.

Not to everybody, mind. Already the rationing is appearing: the BBC suggests that the intervention will be for favoured groups, which at this stage consists of “Small businesses” (which means it might be time to sack that 50th employee and cut one’s borrowing costs!).

One can only begin to guess at what the unintended consequences of this latest intervention will be. However, the two things of which we can be sure are that further interventions will inevitably follow as long as Labour ministers believe that they can over-ride the laws of economics, and that these interventions will continue to have unintended and negative consequences for all of society.

Monday, 20 October 2008

How Labour caused the economic crisis

Four weeks ago I demonstrated how the current financial crisis was a disaster of government's own making. However, most of that was focussed on the American government. In so doing I failed to point out how Gordon Brown (as both Chancellor of the Exchequer and Prime Minister) created the problem.

It is true that the US governmetn deserves much of the blame for forcing banks to lend to un-creditworthy (sub-prime) borrowers and (through the para-statal company Freddie Mac) inventing the practice of securitizing the debt.

But the main source of the problem has been the massive expansion in credit - and indeed money - over the past decade. And while the American government has been as guilty as any of inflationary policies over the past decade, it is Labour that has led UK investors up the garden path with dangerously loose monetary policy.

Having spent ten years allowing Gordon Brown to fan the flames of in an inflationary boom, we are now reaping the whirlwind.

But, I hear you cry, has inflation not been running at around 2%? Isn't that very low>

Well, yes, but only if you look at consumer/retail prices. Sadly for us, economic inflation isn't caused by inflation in the price of consumer goods, which have in fact been falling in real terms since China got its act in gear in the 1990s. Inflation is caused by loose money, which floods through banks, via loans, to be invested in (particularly) capital-industry and land. So the important measure of the inflation isn't CPI or RPI but the money supply.

And how much has the money-supply been inflating over the past decade? The Market Oracle provides this handy chart, which suggests that over the last 5 years the quantity of money swirling around in our economy has doubled.


And where has all that spare cash, utterly un-backed by a corresponding doubling of growth (see GDP figures for 2002 and 2007), gone?

It has been used to bid up the prices of property, shares and capital goods.

However, as demand for them is not actually changed by the new banknotes (electronically) manufactured by the Government, the inevitable "readjustment" is at last taking place as the cost of these goods begins to fall, reflecting their real, non-inflated, value and the cost of consumer goods begins to rise to accomodate the new money in the economy.

As I mentioned a three days ago, further inflation, interest rate cuts and borrowing cannot stop the recession. They can perhaps delay it, and certainly extend it, but in the long run recession is inevitable. We have Labour to thank.

Friday, 17 October 2008

Gordon Brown and the financial crisis: a 1 minute comparison

Three ways to worsen a credit crunch:

1. Lower interest rates: this discourages saving because one gets little reward for delaying one’s gratification (in economic parlance, time-preferences are undervalued), while at the same time encouraging borrowing, thus further reducing the supply of credit relative to demand;
2. Allow inflation to escalate: this also discourages saving because the nominal reward for saving (the amount one’s money goes up) is eroded by the fall in the value of money (what your savings are actually worth), and for the same reason encourages borrowing: at present, the Bank of England base rate is lower than inflation which means that savings are worth less with time (in economic parlance, interest rates are negative);
3. Increase public borrowing: This takes money out of the credit markets: money that is being saved and would be invested in profitable businesses is now diverted into Government bonds and then invested in businesses that are not creditworthy (if they were, they would not need a Government bail-out).

Government policy:

1. Lower interest rates
2. Allow inflation to escalate
3. Increase public borrowing

Remember than the next time somebody tells you that Brown is having a good crisis.

Monday, 29 September 2008

Sub-prime, securitisation and how government caused the financial crisis

The bogeymen-of-the-moment are clearly bankers. Photographs of bankers with their heads – or boxes of their possessions – in their hands are commonplace. The sympathy for the former Lehmans employee does not appear to match that felt for the unemployed docker or miner. Schadenfreude is de rigueur at the moment. And if the banker is the bogeyman, the free markets is the wicked system that is now being exposed for what it is (if only!).

But are our current problems really the fault of capitalists and bankers? There is an altogether different narrative that points the finger in an entirely different direction: the sub-prime and securitisation crises were created by government.

The sub-prime problem begins with the US government's 1977 Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), which allowed the Federal Reserve and other US financial regulators to pressure banks into making loans to less-than-creditworthy borrowers. Far from greed driving bankers to offer 100% loans to unreliable borrowers, this position was forced upon them by government.

Thomas DiLorenzo explains the problem:

When the CRA was created during the Carter administration, the administration also funded with tax dollars numerous ‘community groups’ that have helped the Fed, the Comptroller of the Currency, and other federal regulatory agencies to enforce the act. Under the CRA, if a bank wants to make virtually any change in its business operations — merging, opening up a new branch, getting into a new line of business — it must first prove to regulators that it has made "enough" loans to the government's preferred borrowers. The (partially) tax-funded ‘community groups’ like ACORN (Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now) can file petitions with regulators that stop the bank's activities in their tracks, perhaps defeating them altogether. The banks routinely buy off ACORN and other ‘community groups’ by giving them millions of dollars as well as promising to make even more dubious loans.

Not only is the sub-prime market the result of Federal legislation that forced banks to lend to un-creditworthy borrowers, but the practice of dicing up debts and selling them on in chunks that mixed prime with sub-prime loans was also the creation of a Government body.

In order to try to diversify the risk of these loans, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Company (‘Freddie Mac’) pioneered the ‘securitization’ of bundles of these high-risk loans so that they could be sold on secondary markets. Such ‘securitization’ exploded during the 1990s as a result of government regulation. As Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke himself stated in a March 30, 2007 speech entitled The Community Reinvestment Act: Its Evolution and New Challenges,

Securitization of affordable housing loans expanded, as did the secondary market for these loans, in part reflecting a 1992 law that required the government-sponsored enterprises, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, to devote a large percentage of their activities to meeting affordable housing goals.”

The deregulation of banking in 1994 led to banks to elevate their CRA activities so as to avoid objections by these ‘community groups’ to their business activities. Meanwhile, in 1995 the US Treasury Department created the multibillion-dollar Community Development Financial Institutions to pour taxpayers’ dollars into subsidising sub-prime loans.

Indeed, from 1995 banks were pressurised to make loans “without the benefit of many traditional credit-worthiness criteria, such as the size of the mortgage payment relative to income, savings history, and even income verification! Instead, the Fed told banks that participation in a credit-counseling (sic.) program, many of which are federally funded, could be used as ‘proof’ of a low-income applicant's ability to make his mortgage payments. In other words, federal bank regulators required banks to make bad loans based on nonexistent credit standards.” One cannot help but think that participation in a credit counselling programme suggests that the borrower has had credit trouble in the past and may not be an ideal customer.

Though largely a US based problem analysis has three significant messages for our current situation.

Firstly, the eagerness with which journalists and politicians have blamed bankers is misguided. While there is no doubt that bankers can be and have been greedy, the sub-prime mortgage problem was forced on banks by the US government, while habit of ‘securitising’ debt began with a US government housing agency. This is a problem created by government, not greed.

Secondly, for the above reason, the eagerness with which we look to government to solve the problem is equally misguided. Our faith in more regulation to resolve the current mess is misplaced. To my knowledge HM Government did not force bankers to lend to less reliable borrowers, but the excess of credit in the marketplace as a result of Government’s toleration of inflation in the pursuit of low interest rates meant that banks had to look further down the pecking-order of borrowers to find people to whom to lend. Had money been tighter, there would have been a duel break on the problem as borrowers were more cautious due to facing higher repayments and banks were less eager to accept any borrower due to credit being limited. There might have been fewer 100% mortgages to those with poor credit histories or people who were “self-certificating” (a practice known colloquially as the “Liar’s mortgage”).

Finally, the troubles resulting form the US government’s intervention in housing markets and the deliberate policy of encouraging those on low incomes with poor credit histories to borrow against property casts a cold light upon the Labour government’s proposals to give first time buyers cheap loans, ease the payment of mortgage interest using income support and allow council’s to offer cheap mortgages. This last is particularly pernicious as it opens up the possibility that, in the future, councils will be in the invidious position of having to foreclose on defaulters and repossess their houses (which the defaulter would probably then stay in, now as a tenant of the council!).

Much of the current economic mess has been caused by governments, with the US government to blame for the specific trigger and our own to blame for the underlying mess. Our headlong rush to solve this government-made problem with more regulation risks turning a brief if sharp recession into a long depression. But right now we seem stuck with the mindset that “Something must be done”.