Making the civil service more businesslike

This is all the more amusing for having been written in the 1930s!

Officialdom classifies activity according to the capacity for undertaking it formally acquired by means of examinations and a certain period of service. 'Training' and 'length of service' are the only things which the official brings to the 'job'. If the work of a body of officials appears unsatisfactory, there can be only one explanation: the officials have not had the right training, and future appointments must be made differently. It is therefore proposed that a different training should be required of future candidates. If only the officials of the communal undertaking came with a business training, the undertaking would be more business-like. But for the official who cannot enter into the spirit of capitalist industry this means nothing more than certain external manifestations of business technique: prompter replies to inquiries, the adoption of certain technical office appliances, which have not yet been sufficiently introduced into the departments…, the reduction of unnecessary duplication, and other things. In this way 'the business spirit' penetrates into the offices of communal enterprise. And people are greatly surprised when these men trained on these lines also fail, fail even worse than the much-maligned civil servants, who in fact show themselves superior at least in formal schooling.

It is not difficult to expose the fallacies inherent in such notions. The attributes of the business man cannot be divorced from the position of the entrepreneur in the capitalist order. 'Business' is not in itself a quality innate in a person; only the qualities of mind and character essential to a business man can be inborn. Still less is it an accomplishment which can be acquired by study.... A man does not become a business man by passing some years in commercial training or in a commercial institute, nor by a knowledge of book-keeping and the jargon of commerce...

When these obvious truths became clear in the end the experiment was tried of making entrepreneurs, who had worked successfully for many years, the managers of public enterprises. The result was lamentable. They did no better than the others; furthermore they lacked the sense for formal routine which distinguishes the life-long official. The reason was obvious. An entrepreneur deprived of his characteristic role in economic life ceases to be a business man. However much experience and routine he may bring to his new task he will still only be an official in it. It is just as useless to attempt to solve the problem by new methods of remuneration. It is thought that if the managers of public enterprises were better paid, competition for these posts would arise and make it possible to select the best men. Many go even further and believe that the difficulties will be overcome by granting the managers a share in the profits… But the problem is not nearly so much the question of the manager's share in the profit, as of his share in the losses… To make a man materially interested in profits and hardly concerned in losses simply encourages a lack of seriousness…

(Ludwig von Mises, Socialism, pp215-7.)

Forced bank lending the latest instalment in Labour’s doomed spiral of intervention

Alistair Darling appears set to commit an 80 year old mistake. In his misguided attempts to control the UK economy and force businesses to conform to New Labour’s agenda, he is again going to intervene between banks and their customers.

He has already intervened countless times over the past year, but this latest intervention is pitifully predictable. Indeed, as was explained 80 years ago, it was inevitable that his previous interventions would have unintended consequences that would be the opposite of what he intended, and that to counter those consequences he would be obliged to intervene again and again to ever greater degrees.

Published in 1929, just as another depression was about to rock the world economy, Ludwig von Mises’s Critique of Interventionism demonstrated that as soon as politicians began to intervene in the economy, they would have to continue to do so until ultimately the entire system came under their control. According to von Mises, interventionism was simply unsustainable: either one accepted the laws of economics or one was forced to implement socialism.

We can see how this works if we consider price controls – an example that has striking relevance to Mr. Darling’s current dilemma.

If government tries to fix the price of a commodity, it will not be able to sustain prices below those that the unhampered market would set. This is because with price controls:

"Sellers are forced to sell their goods at lower prices, so that proceeds fall below costs. Therefore, the sellers will abstain from selling and hold on to their goods in the hope that the government regulation will soon be lifted. But the potential buyers will be unable to buy the desired goods."

The result, therefore, will not be the increasing availability that the government sought but a reduced availability of the good resulting from suppliers having no wish to supply at such a low price. To raise supply to the level the government desires at the price the government has mandated, it must therefore intervene again to force suppliers to supply the good: “…it tends to supplement the price ceiling with an order to sell all goods at this price as long as the supply lasts."

However, as the good is now on sale for below its real value, far more customers will emerge than would do so if the good was priced naturally. And since the price is "below that which the unhampered market would set, the same quantity of goods faces a greater number of potential buyers who are willing to pay the lower official price. Supply and demand no longer coincide; demand exceeds supply, and the market mechanism, which tends to bring supply and demand together through changes in price, no longer functions."

There is still not enough of the good to go round, but now it is not because of suppliers reticence but excess demand caused by under-pricing. Government has prevented the price mechanism from operating to prioritise this demand. Therefore another means must be found to decide who gets what, which leads to the third wave of intervention: Rationing.

"Of course, government cannot be content with this selection of buyers. It wants everyone to have the goods at lower prices, and would like to avoid situations in which people cannot get any goods for their money. Therefore, it must go beyond the order to sell; it must resort to rationing. The quantity of merchandise coming to the market is no longer left to the discretion of sellers and buyers."

But why, if the price is below that at which suppliers can make a profit, would they produce the good at all? Only if the government intervenes to force the production of the good. Consequently, the fourth intervention takes place:

"When that is exhausted the empty inventories will not be replenished because production no longer covers its costs. If government wants to secure a supply for consumers it must pronounce an obligation to produce."

And how can this be achieved when costs are below prices? Only by driving down costs, which requires government to intervene to set the prices of the factors of production that go into producing the good. Ergo, "it must fix the prices of raw materials and semi-manufactured products, and eventually also wage rates, and force businessmen and workers to produce and labor [sic.] at these prices."

But what, you may ask, has this to do with Mr. Darling? If one considers money and borrowing to be commodities, the answer is everything.

Government has long been intervening to keep the cost of borrowing below the market rate. This is the role of central banks: they enable governments to control the supply of money by forcing lending rates down below the market rate, so stimulating artificial and unsustainable booms that keep the voters sweet until the next election. The Bank of England did this again last month. Under normal circumstances, a “credit crunch” should result in an increase in the cost of borrowing. This would result in more saving and less borrowing until a new equilibrium was reached. However, the government has intervened to keep the cost of borrowing low.

As von Mises predicted, however, this has had unintended consequences. The government may have wanted low interest rates, but the banks were still inclined to set interest rates based on risk: as default is more likely now than it was a couple of years ago, the cost of borrowing is raised to take an actuarial account of risk. Also, as the banks have limited capital, they are bound to lend to the most profitable borrowers: those who will pay higher rates. So inevitably the government is again inclined to intervene to force banks to lower rates.

The predictable result is that banks won’t lend. They’d rather buy government securities or look abroad for more valuable investments than lend to businesses and householders at rates that are no higher than inflation or make a tiny real return but involve huge risk (companies will go to the wall; mortgagees will default). So the third intervention comes, as Darling forces the banks to lend.

Not to everybody, mind. Already the rationing is appearing: the BBC suggests that the intervention will be for favoured groups, which at this stage consists of “Small businesses” (which means it might be time to sack that 50th employee and cut one’s borrowing costs!).

One can only begin to guess at what the unintended consequences of this latest intervention will be. However, the two things of which we can be sure are that further interventions will inevitably follow as long as Labour ministers believe that they can over-ride the laws of economics, and that these interventions will continue to have unintended and negative consequences for all of society.